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Abstract
Imposing some constraints on public debt is often justified regarding
sustainability and stability issues. This is especially the case when the
ratio of public debt over GDP is restricted to be constant. Using a Ramsey
model, we show that such a constraint can however be a fundamental
source of indeterminacy, and therefore, of expectation-driven fluctuations.
Indeed, through the intertemporal budget constraint of the government,
income taxation negatively depends on future debt, i.e. on the expected
level of production. This mechanism ensures that expectations on the
future tax rate may be self-fulfilling. We show that this is promoted by a
larger ratio of debt over GDP.
JEL classification: E32, H20, H68.
Keywords: Indeterminacy, endogenous cycles, public debt, income taxa-
tion.
1 Introduction
To dampen the effects of the last financial crisis, many countries have engaged in
expansionist fiscal policies. Such policies have been carried out even in countries
that already experienced large levels of public debt. This partly explains the
sovereign debt crisis that followed. To decrease the associated insolvency risk
of public debt, there is now an increasing consensus to promote fiscal policies
that fulfill some constraints on public debt. In accordance for instance with the
Maastricht treaty, the rule stipulating that the ratio of public debt over GDP
has to be less than a maximal value is often advocated to promote sustainability
and stability.
Assuming that this constraint is binding, as now in the US and most Eu-
ropean countries, we show that imposing such a rule can however be a source
of macroeconomic instability related to self-fulfilling expectations on the future
∗This work has been carried out thanks to the support of the A*MIDEX project (n° ANR-
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#(B)23330063.
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income tax rate. Indeed, if agents expect an increase of the future tax rate, they
will invest less, implying a lower income in the future. According to the debt
constraint, debt emission should be lower, and therefore the income tax rate has
to increase today to satisfy the government intertemporal budget constraint.
To address this issue, we consider a Ramsey [12] model extended by the
introduction of a public sector. A constant level of public spending is financed
through debt and distortionary taxation on income and debt earnings. To avoid
insolvency of public debt, we introduce a debt constraint defined as a constant
ratio of debt over GDP.1 This ratio is considered as a policy parameter fixed by
the government. The tax rate adjusts at each period to fulfill the intertemporal
budget constraint of the government. Of course, when the ratio of debt over
GDP is set at zero, there is no debt and the tax rate is counter-cyclical: a larger
current income implies that a lower tax rate is needed to finance the public
spending. When a positive level of debt is issued, the endogenous tax rate also
depends on future income and capital level: if capital and, therefore, income
raise at the next period, debt emission can be larger. Hence, current public
spending is financed by further debt and a lower tax rate is needed to fulfill the
government budget constraint. This means that the tax rate decreases with the
next period level of income and capital.
Since labor is exogenous, the main effect of this fiscal policy goes through a
distortion that affects the return of assets, especially capital. At a steady state,
the tax rate is counter-cyclical, i.e. negatively depends on the level of capital:
a larger amount of capital means a lower cost of debt reimbursement, more
debt emission and a larger tax base. Hence, capital has two opposite effects on
the after-tax interest rate: a positive one since the tax rate is counter-cyclical
and a negative one as marginal productivity of capital is decreasing. These two
opposite effects explain the multiplicity of steady states, generically an even
number. They also explain that a larger level of debt-output ratio or public
spending may raise capital accumulation and welfare. Obviously, both of these
policy parameters have a positive effect on the tax rate, but the government
intertemporal budget constraint may be balanced by an increase of capital,
which implies a lower cost of debt reimbursement, more debt emission and a
larger tax base.
Above all, the debt-output ratio affects dynamics, through the occurrence of
expectation-driven fluctuations. To highlight this question, we first show that
without debt, locall indeterminacy is always ruled out. However, the steady
state can loose its saddle-path stability if the elasticity of capital-labor substi-
tution is large enough. Moreover, if inputs are sufficiently substitutable and
the intertemporal substitution in consumption is high enough, cycles of period
two can also occur. This loss of stability comes from the above mentioned
counter-cyclicality of the tax rate that implies an after-tax interest rate which
is increasing with respect to current capital. Through the Euler equation, it
promotes unstable dynamic paths and deterministic oscillations.
1Note that a similar constraint has been considered by de la Croix and Michel [2], or more
recently by Minea and Villieu [10].
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In contrast, when the debt-output ratio is positive, indeterminacy may occur.
The loss of saddle-path stability also requires a large enough input substitution.
However, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is large
enough, the steady state is not unstable anymore, but becomes indeterminate
through the occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation. Deterministic cycles occur, but
also expectation-driven fluctuations. As explained earlier, when the debt-output
ratio is positive, the tax rate negatively depends on next period capital stock,
as it decreases with respect to new debt emission. This channel mainly explains
the indeterminacy of the tax rate. Any expectation of a larger tax rate tomor-
row implies less investment, i.e. a lower future stock of capital, which raises the
current tax rate. We also note that the larger the debt-output ratio, the larger
the range of elasticities of intertemporal substitution in consumption for inde-
terminacy. In this sense, a larger debt-output ratio promotes the volatility due
to expectation-driven fluctuations. Hence, fixing the level of debt over output,
a government faces a trade-off between volatility and welfare evaluated at the
steady state. Reducing this ratio, fluctuations due to the volatility of expecta-
tions may be ruled out, but at the cost of a decreased stationary welfare.
The key ingredient driving our results is a distortion, explained by the en-
dogenous tax rate, that affects the real interest rate. In fact, a huge literature
has studied the (de)stabilizing role of non-linear tax rates on local indetermi-
nacy. One can refer to Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [14] or Guo and Lansing [7]
for income taxation, Giannitsarou [4] or Nourry et al. [11] for consumption
taxation, Lloyd-Braga et al. [8] for a critical approach. In contrast to us, these
papers do not consider variable public debt and indeterminacy requires endoge-
nous labor. The closest paper to ours is surely Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [14],
where a constant level of public spending is financed through income taxation.
Since they consider a balanced budget, the tax rate depends on current income
only.2 Therefore, in contrast to our result, indeterminacy requires a sufficiently
elastic labor supply, which is at odds with empirical evidence (Blundell and
MaCurdy [1], Rogerson and Wallenius [13]).
In fact, the interplay between debt, capital and dynamics has been studied
in a few papers only. Most of them consider endogenous growth frameworks.
For instance, Greiner [6] exhibits the existence of a Hopf cycle, but there is no
indeterminacy. The main ingredient for his result relies on his constraint on
public debt sustainability which is very different from our, stipulating that the
primary surplus is a linear function of income and debt. In Futagami et al.
[3], the debt constraint concerns the ratio of debt over capital. There exist two
steady states and local indeterminacy may emerge. In contrast to us, it is ex-
plained by productive public spending, while the tax rate is constant. However,
as shown by Minea and Villieu [10], the mutiplicities are ruled out when the
constraint is rather on the ratio of debt over output. Minea and Villieu [9] also
consider productive public spending and a constant tax rate. Their sustainabil-
ity constraint imposes that the deficit over output is constant. A type of global
indeterminacy is exhibited that allows to explain a trap. We show here that
2For their simulations, they consider an extension with debt, but taken as constant.
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we can get simultaneously global indeterminacy associated to the multiplicity
of steady states, and local indeterminacy with persistent fluctuations around a
steady state.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model.
In Section 3, we analyze steady states and welfare. In Section 4, we show that
indeterminacy occurs under a positive debt-output ratio only and we provide
economic intuitions for our main results. A conclusion is given in Section 5,
whereas most technical details are provided in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a discrete time economy (t = 0, 1, ...,∞), with three types of agents,
households, firms and a government.
2.1 Households
There is a representative infinitely lived household who supplies inelastically one
unit of labor, holds k0 > 0 as capital endowment and b0 > 0 as initial public
debt. Denoting ct his consumption at period t, the consumer’s intertemporal
utility function is given by:
+∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct) (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and the utility function satisfies the
following assumption:
Assumption 1. u (c) is C0 over [0,+∞), C2 over (0,+∞) and satisfies u′ (c) >
0, u′′ (c) < 0. In addition, the Inada condition limc→0 u
′ (c) = +∞ holds. For
further reference, we introduce the following elasticity: ǫcc(c) ≡ −cu
′′(c)/u′(c) >
0.
Each household derives income from wage, capital and government bonds
that allow to finance public debt. Denote rt the real interest rate on physical
capital, r¯t the return on government bonds, wt the real wage, δ ∈ (0, 1) the rate
of capital depreciation and τt ∈ [0, 1) the tax rate on income. The household
maximizes (1) facing the budget constraint:
ct + kt+1 + bt+1 = (1 − τt)[rtkt + wt] + [1 + (1 − τt)r¯t]bt + (1 − δ)kt (2)
Utility maximization gives:
u′ (ct)
βu′ (ct+1)
= Rt+1 (3)
u′ (ct)
βu′ (ct+1)
= 1 + (1− τt+1)r¯t+1 (4)
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with Rt+1 ≡ (1− τt+1)rt+1 + 1− δ and the transversality conditions:
lim
t→+∞
βtu′ (ct) kt+1 = 0 and lim
t→+∞
βtu′ (ct) bt+1 = 0 (5)
must hold. We get at the equilibrium the equality Rt+1 = 1+ (1− τ)r¯t+1 since
physical capital kt+1 and government bonds bt+1 are perfectly substitutable
saving assets.
2.2 Firms
A representative firm produces the final good yt, using a technology with con-
stant returns yt = AF (Kt, Lt). We denote F (kt, 1) ≡ f(kt), with kt ≡ Kt/Lt.
The production function f (k) satisfies:
Assumption 2. f (k) is C0 over [0,+∞), C2 over (0,+∞) and satisfies f ′ (k) >
0, f ′′ (k) < 0. In addition, the conditions limk→0 f
′ (k) = +∞, limk→+∞ f
′ (k) =
0 and limk→+∞ f (k) = +∞ hold.
Profit maximization gives:
rt = Af
′ (kt) ≡ r (kt) and wt = Af (kt)− ktAf
′ (kt) ≡ w (kt) (6)
In the following, we denote by s (k) ≡ kf ′ (k) /f (k) ∈ (0, 1) the capital share
in total income and σ (k) ≡ [s (k)− 1] f ′ (k) / [kf ′′ (k)] ≥ 0 the elasticity of
capital-labor substitution. We derive the following useful relationships:
r′(k)k/r(k) ≡ −(1− s(k))/σ(k) and w′(k)k/w(k) ≡ s(k)/σ(k) (7)
2.3 Government
At each time t, a constant level of public spending G > 03 and debt issued at
period t − 1 are financed by taxation of income and debt yields, at the rate
τt ∈ [0, 1), and by issuing new debt bt+1. The government faces the following
budget constraint:
G+ (1 + r¯t)bt = τt(yt + r¯tbt) + bt+1 (8)
We will assume that debt is a fixed proportion of GDP, namely bt = αyt.
In accordance for instance with the Maastricht criteria, this restriction can be
seen as a stabilizing constraint on debt that prevents any explosive behavior. It
has previously been introduced by de la Croix and Michel [2], and Minea and
Villieu [10]. In the following, α will be seen as a policy parameter under the
control of the government. The case without debt is of course obtained when
α = 0.
3Public spending neither enters the utility function, nor the technology. Since public
spending is constant, this is not an issue.
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2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
As the representative household supplies inelastically one unit of labor, equilib-
rium on the labor market requires Lt = 1. Equilibrium on the asset markets is
ensured by 1+(1−τt)r¯t = (1−τt)r (kt)+1−δ where, using (8) and bt = αAf(kt),
the tax rate is endogenously determined by:
τt =
G−αAf(kt+1)
Af(kt)(1+αAf ′(kt))
+ α 1−δ+Af
′(kt)
1+αAf ′(kt)
(9)
Let ∆t ≡ 1− τt, with:
∆t =
αAf(kt+1)−G
Af(kt)(1+αAf ′(kt))
+ 1−α(1−δ)1+αAf ′(kt) (10)
Taking into account that debt is a fixed proportion of GDP, we define an
intertemporal equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1. Under Assumptions 1-2, given k0 > 0,
4 an intertemporal equi-
librium is a sequence (kt, ct), for t = 0, 1...+∞, satisfying:
u′ (ct) = βRt+1u
′ (ct+1) (11)
ct + kt+1 + αAf(kt+1) = Rt(kt + αAf(kt)) + ∆tw(kt) (12)
where ∆t is given by (10), Rt = ∆tr (kt)+1−δ and the transversality condition
limt→+∞ β
tu′ (ct) (kt+1 + αf(kt+1)) = 0 holds.
3 Steady state analysis
Let
∆(k) ≡ 1+αδ−G/(Af(k))1+αAf ′(k) (13)
A steady state is defined by:
c = (1/β − 1)(k + αAf(k)) + ∆(k)w(k) (14)
H(k) ≡ ∆(k)Af ′(k) = θ/β (15)
with θ ≡ 1 − β(1 − δ) ∈ (0, 1). The stationary value of k is obtained from
equation (15) and equation (14) determines the stationary level of c. Hence, the
existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of steady states is given by the number
of solutions k of (15).
Any steady state has to satisfy τ ∈ [0, 1), or equivalently ∆(k) ∈ (0, 1]. This
restriction leads to the following result:
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1-2, there exist k¯ > k > 0 such that any
stationary solution k belongs to (k, k].
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
4To be consistent with the debt constraint, we should have b0 = αAf(k0).
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3.1 Existence and multiplicity of steady states
At a steady state, the tax rate is counter-cyclical, i.e. decreasing in k, because
we have ∆′(k)k/∆(k) > 0. Since the marginal productivity of capital Af ′(k) is
decreasing, capital k has two opposite effects on the after-tax real interest rate
H(k) which explain the multiplicity of steady states.
To analyze the existence and the number of stationary solutions, let us focus
on equation (15). We have H(k) = 0, H(k) < θ/β (see Appendix 6.2) and:
ǫH(k) ≡
H′(k)k
H(k) =
1
1+αδ−G/(Af(k))
[
s(k)G
Af(k) −
1−s(k)
σ(k) ∆(k)
]
(16)
Therefore, ǫH(k) > 0 if and only if σ(k) > σ
α
T (k), with:
σαT (k) ≡
1−s(k)
s(k)G/(Af(k))∆(k) (17)
We then derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-2, there are bounds δˆ ∈ (0, 1) and βˆ ∈
(0, 1) such that there generically exist an even number of steady states k ∈ (k, k]
if δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and β ∈ (βˆ, 1).
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
Note that Proposition 1 still applies if α = 0 except that k tends to +∞.5 By
direct inspection of equations (16) and (17), we derive that there are two steady
states if σ(k)− σαT (k) is decreasing in k.
Example: Consider a CES technology f(k) = (sk
σ−1
σ + 1 − s)
σ
σ−1 , with
s ∈ (0, 1) and σ ∈ (0, 1]. When σ = 1, we get the Cobb-Douglas formulation
f(k) = ks. We have s(k) = f ′(k)k/f(k) = sk
σ−1
σ /(sk
σ−1
σ + 1 − s). When
σ ≤ 1, s(k) is decreasing in k or constant and thus σαT (k) is increasing in k.
Graphically, we get:
✲
✻
H(k)
k0
θ/β
k kko ke
Figure 1: Existence and multiplicity of steady states
We then derive:
5Note that if G = 0, which is excluded in this paper, our analysis of multiplicity does not
apply. Indeed, in this case, the tax rate is zero, there is no distortion, and there is a unique
steady state satisfying f ′(k) = θ/β, as usually in the optimal growth model.
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Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 1-2 hold, δ ∈ (0, δˆ), β ∈ (βˆ, 1) and f(k) =
(sk
σ−1
σ + 1 − s)
σ
σ−1 with s ∈ (0, 1) and σ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, there exist two steady
states ko, ke ∈ (k, k¯).
As mentioned earlier, the multiplicity of steady states occur because capital
has two opposite effects on the after-tax interest rate ∆(k)Af ′(k). The marginal
productivity of capital decreases with k, but the tax rate is counter-cyclical,
implying that ∆(k) raises with k. Indeed, a larger level of capital means, on the
one hand, a lower interest rate and therefore a lower cost for debt reimbursement
and, on the other hand, a larger income, i.e. a larger debt to finance public
spendings and a larger tax base.
Using (13), we further see that ∆(k) does not only depend on the marginal
productivity of capital, but also on the level of production. This means that the
tax rate is counter-cyclical even if the inputs are arbitrarily large substitutes. On
the contrary, the decreasing relationship between f ′(k) and k is weakened when
the elasticity of input substitution is large enough. Therefore, the two opposite
effects of capital on the after tax interest rate ∆(k)Af ′(k) are reinforced when
σ is not arbitrarily large, which explains the results of Corollary 1.
In any case, the multiplicity of steady states is a form of global indeter-
minacy. In endogenous growth models, Futagami et al. [3] and Minea and
Villieu [9] similarly obtain a multiplicity of stationary growth paths. However,
when a sustainability constraint on the ratio of debt over output is considered,
this multiplicity is ruled out (Minea and Villieu [10]). This is not the case in
our framework since, due to the government budget constraint, the tax rate is
endogenous.
As we will see now, the multiplicity of steady states also allows us to identify
some contrasted effects of fiscal policy depending on the level of capital.
3.2 Comparative statics and welfare
Let ko be a steady state such that ǫH(ko) > 0, or equivalently σ(ko) > σ
α
T (ko),
and ke a steady state such that ǫH(ke) < 0, or equivalently σ(ke) < σ
α
T (ke).
Following an increase of one of the two policy parameters α or G, we deter-
mine now how the levels of capital, consumption and, therefore, welfare evolve
depending on the steady state which is considered.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-2, we have that:
• a larger α or G increases the levels of capital, consumption and welfare at
a steady state ko;
• a larger α or G decreases the levels of capital, consumption and welfare at
a steady state ke.
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
The tax rate increases with both G and α. Indeed, a larger public spending
and a heavier debt burden have to be financed through a higher tax rate. The
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marginal productivity of capital is of course decreasing with capital, while the
tax rate is counter-cyclical, i.e. decreasing with capital. These two effects go in
opposite directions. When the first effect dominates (steady state ke), a larger
level of either G or α, that positively affects the tax rate, is mainly compensated
by an increase of the marginal productivity of capital, i.e. a decrease of capital.
On the contrary, when the second effect dominates (steady state ko), it is mainly
compensated by a raise of capital which negatively affects the tax rate, because
of a lower cost of debt and a larger income.
The effects on consumption and welfare are derived taking into account,
first, that consumption positively depends on capital and changes in policy
parameters mainly modify consumption through their effects on capital and,
second, that welfare raises with consumption.
To fix ideas, consider the configuration where there are two steady states (see
for instance Corollary 1). Steady states are ranked according to their capital
level, i.e. ko < ke (see Figure 1). According to our results, an expansive policy
is recommended when the economy is characterized by a low level of capital,
whereas at the steady state with the larger level of capital, the government is
rather recommended to reduce public spending and/or the debt-output ratio.
3.3 Normalized steady state
We now use a standard method to ensure the existence of a steady state, which
value is not affected by the structural parameters such that the elasticity of
capital-labor substitution, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption or the share of debt over GDP that will be used as bifurcation pa-
rameters in the local stability analysis. A normalized steady state k = 1 is a
solution of ∆(1)Af ′(1) = θ/β, with:
∆(1) = 1+αδ−G/(Af(1))1+αAf ′(1) (18)
Let us introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 3. α < αMax ≡ β/(1− β)
It is not restrictive as β is usually chosen to be close to one. We derive the
following proposition:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-3, there exists A∗ > 0 such that k = 1
is a normalized steady state if and only if A = A∗ > 0. The corresponding value
of consumption is c = (1/β − 1)(1 + αA∗f(1)) + ∆(1)w(1).
Proof. See Appendix 6.4.
In the following, let us denote s ≡ s(1), σ ≡ σ(1) and ǫcc ≡ ǫcc(c). As
there generically exist an even number of steady states which are characterized
by different welfare properties, we need to know whether the normalized steady
state is located on an increasing portion of the curve H(k) (as ko) or on a
decreasing portion (as ke).
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Corollary 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, let A = A∗ and consider σT ≡ σ
α
T (1) > 0
as given by (17). Then, the normalized steady state k = 1 corresponds to ko
when σ > σT and to ke when σ < σT .
Proof. See Appendix 6.5.
Note that σT appears not to depend on α (see Appendix 6.5).
4 Expectation-driven volatility under a positive
debt-output ratio
We start by considering the benchmark case of an economy without debt. We
will show that local indeterminacy and therefore sunspot fluctuations cannot
arise. In a second step, when the debt-output ratio is positive, we will show
that local indeterminacy of the normalized steady state may emerge. We will
then prove that a sufficiently large debt-output ratio is destabilizing, promoting
expectation-driven fluctuations.
4.1 The economy without debt
The economy without debt is obviously obtained when α = 0. The stability
properties of the steady state are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-2, let A = A∗ and α = 0. Then, there
exist ǫ0F > 0, σ
0
F ≥ 0 and σT > 0 such that the following results generically hold.
• If ǫcc < ǫ
0
F , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT , a source
for σT < σ < σ
0
F , and a saddle for σ > σ
0
F .
• If ǫcc > ǫ
0
F , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT and a
source for σ > σT .
Flip and transcritical bifurcations generically occurs when σ crosses respectively
σ0F and σT .
Proof. See Appendix 6.6.
This proposition shows that without debt, local indeterminacy never occurs,
ruling out expectation-driven fluctuations. However, deterministic endogenous
business cycles may emerge through a flip bifurcation if the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption is sufficiently large and inputs are sufficiently
substitutes. Otherwise, the steady state is either saddle-path stable or unstable.
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4.2 The economy with positive debt
Let us now consider the economy with positive debt assuming α > 0. Our aim
is to check whether debt has a stabilizing or a destabilizing effect on the econ-
omy promoting or not expectation-driven fluctuations. We derive the following
results:
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1-3, let A = A∗ and α > 0. Then, there
exist β˜ ∈ (0, 1), δ˜ ∈ (0, 1), α˜, αǫF ∈ (0, αMax) with α˜ < αǫF , ǫ
α
H ≥ 0, ǫ
α
F > 0,
σαF ≥ 0 and σT > 0 such that when β ∈ (β˜, 1) and δ ∈ (0, δ˜), the following
results generically hold.
1 - For any given α ∈ (0, α˜):
• If ǫcc ≥ ǫ
α
F , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT and a
source for σ > σT .
• If ǫαH < ǫcc < ǫ
α
F , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT , a
source for σT < σ < σ
α
F and a saddle for σ > σ
α
F .
• If ǫcc < ǫ
α
H , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT , a sink for
σT < σ < σ
α
F and a saddle for σ > σ
α
F .
2 - For any given α ∈ (α˜, αǫF ):
• If ǫcc > ǫ
α
H , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT and a
source for σ > σT .
• If ǫαF ≤ ǫcc < ǫ
α
H , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT and
a sink for σ > σT .
• If ǫcc < ǫ
α
F , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT , a sink for
σT < σ < σ
α
F and a saddle for σ > σ
α
F .
3 - For any given α ∈ (αǫF , αMax):
• If ǫcc > ǫ
α
H , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT and a
source for σ > σT .
• If ǫcc < ǫ
α
H , the normalized steady state is a saddle for σ < σT and a sink
for σ > σT .
In each case, flip and transcritical bifurcations generically occur when σ crosses
respectively σαF and σT .
Proof. See Appendix 6.7.
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption 1/ǫcc is
too low, i.e. smaller than 1/ǫαH , the steady state is either saddle-path stable or
unstable. Such a result also arises in the absence of public debt (see Proposition
4). On the contrary, when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption 1/ǫcc is large enough, i.e. larger than 1/ǫ
α
H , the steady state becomes
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locally indeterminate when σ crosses σT from below. It is important to note
from the expression (27) (as given in Appendix 6.5) that the critical value σT
does not depend on the debt-output ratio α, and is quite low when β ∈ (β˜, 1)
and δ ∈ (0, δ˜) (as θ is close to zero). This means that as soon as the debt-output
ratio is positive, expectation-driven fluctuations may occur.
Contrary to most of existing contributions considering one-sector growth
models, indeterminacy is obtained here in an economy with exogenous labor. By
continuity, we conjecture that expectation-driven fluctuations would still occur
under a weakly elastic labor supply, which is a realistic assumption (Blundell and
MaCurdy [1], Rogerson and Wallenius [13]). This is explained by the fact that
the fiscal policy we consider introduces a distortion ∆t that does not only depend
on current capital kt, but also on future capital kt+1, and is in contrast to many
contributions that analyzed the role of non-linear tax on expectation-driven
fluctuations. The closest paper to ours is surely Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [14],
where a constant level of public spending is financed through income taxation.
Since they do not consider debt, the tax rate depends on current income only
and indeterminacy requires a sufficiently elastic labor supply, which implies
some unconventional labor supply function that is decreasing with respect to
the wage rate. Such a restrictive condition is obviously not necessary in our
framework.
It is also worthwhile to note that, for a given level of σ larger than σT ,
when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption 1/ǫcc increases
and crosses the value 1/ǫαH from below, the steady state becomes locally in-
determinate through a Hopf bifurcation generating quasi-periodic endogenous
fluctuations:6
Corollary 3. Under Assumptions 1-3, let A = A∗, α > 0, β ∈ (β, 1) and
δ ∈ (0, δ¯). Then the following results generically hold.
1 - For any given α ∈ (0, α˜), if σT < σ < σ
α
F , the normalized steady state is
a sink for ǫcc < ǫ
α
H and becomes a source for ǫ
α
H < ǫcc < ǫ
α
F .
2 - For any given α ∈ (α˜, αǫF ), if σ > σT , the normalized steady state is a
sink for ǫαF 6 ǫcc < ǫ
α
H and becomes a source for ǫcc > ǫ
α
H .
3 - For any given α ∈ (αǫF , αMax), if σ > σT , the normalized steady state
is a sink for ǫcc < ǫ
α
H and becomes a source for ǫcc > ǫ
α
H .
In each case, a Hopf bifurcation generically occurs when ǫcc crosses ǫ
α
H ,
Note that in contrast to σT , the critical values ǫ
α
H , ǫ
α
F and σ
α
F depend on
the debt-output ratio α (see Appendix 6.7). In particular, ǫαH and ǫ
α
H are re-
spectively increasing and decreasing functions of α while σαF is an increasing
function of α, so that the range of values of ǫcc and σ enlarges when α increases.
Therefore, for given values of ǫcc and σ, when α raises from 0, we can derive
from the above analysis some precise effect of debt on the stability properties
of the normalized steady state.
6As shown by Grandmont et al. [5], the existence of a Hopf bifurcation also allows to
generate sunspot fluctuations far from the steady state, i.e. in the neighborhood of the quasi-
periodic cycle.
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Corollary 4. Under Assumptions 1-3, let A = A∗ and consider the critical
values α˜, ǫαH , ǫ
α
F , σ
α
F and σT > 0 as given in Proposition 5. Assume that
ǫcc ∈ (ǫ
α˜
H , ǫ
0
F ) and σ > σ
0
F (> σT ). Then, there exist β ∈ (0, 1), δ¯ ∈ (0, 1),
αF ∈ (0, α˜) and αH ∈ (α˜, αMax) such that when β ∈ (β, 1) and δ ∈ (0, δ¯), the
normalized steady state is a saddle for α ∈ [0, αF ), a source for α ∈ (αF , αH)
and a sink for α ∈ (αH , αMax). Moreover, flip and Hopf bifurcations generically
occur when α crosses respectively αF and αH .
Proof. See Appendix 6.8.
Corollary 4 clearly shows that debt has a destabilizing effect, generating
endogenous cycles and self-fulfilling expectations. It is worth noting however
that this destabilizing effect has to be mitigated by the welfare analysis. Indeed,
as shown by Corollary 2, along a steady state ko, around which indeterminacy
may occur, a raise of α improves the stationary welfare.
4.3 Economic intuition
We now focus on the economic mechanisms that generate the loss of saddle-
path stability and the emergence of indeterminacy. Recall that the dynamics
are governed by the Euler equation describing the intertemporal trade-off faced
by households and their budget constraint. Using (2) and (8), this budget
constraint can also be written:
ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt +G = yt = Af(kt) (19)
and using for simplification the utility function u(c) = c1−ǫcc/(1−ǫcc), the Euler
equation becomes: (
ct+1
ct
)ǫcc
= β(1 − δ +∆t+1rt+1) (20)
where rt+1 is given by (6) and ∆t+1 by (10).
When compared with the standard Ramsey model, these two equations are
modified first by the constant level of public expenditures G > 0, and second by
the fact that the usual intertemporal households’ trade-off is now affected by a
distortion ∆t+1 = 1 − τt+1 lowering the return of capital. A direct inspection
of (10) shows that ∆t+1 is a function of kt+1 and kt+2, where the derivatives
∂∆t+1/∂kt+2 and ∂∆t+1/∂kt+1, evaluated at the normalized steady state, are
respectively given by the following expressions
B4(α) ≡
αs
1 + αA∗f ′
> 0 (21)
B5(α, σ) ≡
(
G
A∗f − α
)
s(1 + αA∗f ′) + αA∗f ′ 1−sσ
(
1 + αδ − GA∗f
)
(1 + αA∗f ′)2
(22)
When the debt-output ratio α is equal to 0, we have ∂∆t+1/∂kt+2 = 0 and
∂∆t+1/∂kt+1 > 0. The tax rate is then counter-cyclical, decreasing with pro-
duction and capital of the same period. This distortion explains the instability
of the steady state. Of course, in the limit case where G = 0, the tax rate is
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zero, i.e. there is no distortion, and σT tends to +∞. The steady state is unique
and saddle-path stable in this last case.
To give a more intuitive explanation of instability, using (7), (18) and (22),
we compute the elasticity of ∆t+1rt+1 with respect to kt+1 which is given by
sG/(A∗f)
1−G/(A∗f) −
1−s
σ
This expression is strictly positive for σ > σT . As shown in Proposition 4,
this is a necessary condition to have instability. This condition means that the
after-tax interest rate is increasing in capital of the same period and its role
on instability can be understood as follows. Suppose that one deviates from
the steady state by an increase of capital kt. Using (19), this generates a raise
of income and therefore, of ct and kt+1. The above discussion allows us to
conclude that the after-tax interest rate raises. Using (20), this implies a raise
of consumption growth ct+1/ct that explains unstable dynamic paths.
Proposition 4 also establishes that a cycle of period 2 occurs through a
flip bifurcation if the elasticity of capital-labor substitution crosses the value
σ0F , which is larger than σT , ensuring that the after-tax interest rate is still
increasing in capital. It also requires that ǫcc is sufficiently small (ǫcc < ǫ
0
F ).
To explain the emergence of such a cycle, consider than one deviates from the
steady state through a decrease of ct exactly compensated by an increase of
kt+1. This implies an increase of the after-tax rate ∆t+1rt+1. Because ǫcc
is small, we derive from the Euler equation (20) an arbitrarily large raise of
consumption growth ct+1/ct. This means that ct+1 strongly raises. Therefore,
even if kt+1 increases, and income at period t + 1 too, kt+2 reduces, which
explains oscillations and the existence of cycles of period 2.
When the debt-output ratio α is strictly positive, we have ∂∆t/∂kt+1 >
0, i.e. the tax rate τt negatively depends on future capital kt+1. When the
production at the next period reduces, future debt needs to reduce as well
because of the debt constraint. Therefore, public spending is further financed
by taxation. As shown in Proposition 5, expectation-driven fluctuations may
occur if ǫcc is low enough. As we will explain now, the negative link between τt
and kt+1 is a key mechanism to get local indeterminacy.
Indeed, if households expect a larger tax rate at the next period, they expect
a lower return for their investment. Therefore, kt+1 reduces. Through the effect
explained above, the current tax rate raises. Hence, depending on expectations
on future tax rates, alternative dynamic paths can be constructed. However, to
be self-fulfilling, these dynamic paths should satisfy the inter-temporal house-
hold’s choice (20). On the one hand, a lower return for kt+1 means that ∆t+1rt+1
decreases. On the other hand, because capital kt is predetermined, the decrease
of kt+1 implies a raise of consumption ct (see equation (19)). The decrease of
kt+1 can also generate a decrease of future consumption ct+1, because it lowers
the income Af(kt+1). This last effect is fully rationalized by the inter-temporal
household’s choice (20). Indeed, if ǫcc is low enough, the decrease of ∆t+1rt+1
implies a strong fall of consumption growth ct+1/ct, which is explained not only
by a larger consumption at period t, but also a smaller consumption at period
t + 1. In this case, expectations are self-fulfilling and the associated dynamic
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path experiences oscillations through the reversal of consumption through time.
We finally note that a larger α reinforces the intertemporal channel on the
tax rate ∂∆t+1/∂kt+2 which is the source of indeterminacy, and which shows
that a larger ratio of debt over GDP promotes expectation-driven fluctuations
(Corollaries 3 and 4).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we consider a Ramsey model extended to include a public sector
with public spending financed by income taxation and public debt. In order
to guarantee sustainability, debt is assumed to be a fixed proportion of GDP.
The tax rate, which adjusts to satisfy the government budget constraint, then
depends on current capital, through income and debt reimbursement, and on
next period capital through expected debt emission.
Along a stationary solution, capital has two opposite effects on the after-tax
interest rate: a positive one since the tax rate is counter-cyclical and a negative
one through the marginal productivity. These two opposite effects explain the
multiplicity of steady states and also imply that a larger level of debt-output
ratio or public spending can foster capital accumulation and welfare. Indeed,
at a steady state, they both imply a stronger fiscal pressure, which may be
dampened by a raise of income.
Since income taxation decreases following a larger level of future debt emis-
sion, the tax rate becomes counter-cyclical with respect to the expected income.
This relationship is a key mechanism for indeterminacy. Indeed, if agents expect
a larger future tax rate, they decrease investment. This means lower debt emis-
sion and therefore a larger tax rate today to balance the budget. We show that
the occurrence of expectation-driven volatility associated to this indeterminacy
is promoted by a larger debt-output ratio.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Any steady state has to satisfy τ ∈ [0, 1), or equivalently ∆(k) ∈ (0, 1]. On the
one hand, ∆(k) > 0 requires:
Af(k) > G1+αδ
This is satisfied for k > k, where k is defined by Af(k) = G/(1 + αδ).
On the other hand, ∆(k) 6 1 is equivalent to:
α[δ −Af ′(k)] 6 GAf(k) (23)
When k increases from 0 to +∞, the left-hand side increases from−∞ to αδ > 0,
while the right-hand side decreases from G/(Af(0)) > 0 to 0. Therefore, there
is a unique k, defined by α[δ −Af ′(k)] = G/(Af(k)), such that inequality (23)
is satisfied for all k 6 k. Substituting k in (23), one can easily check that k < k.
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Note that when α = 0, k keeps a finite and strictly positive value, whereas k
tends to +∞.7
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider the expression H(k) = ∆(k)Af ′(k). When k = k, we have
obviously H(k) = 0 < θ/β. Moreover, when k = k¯, we get H(k) = Af ′(k) =
δ −G/[αAf(k)] < θ/β since
G/[αAf(k)] > δ − θβ = −
1−β
β
Let us now consider the expressions of ǫH(k) and σ
α
T (k) respectively given by
(16) and (17). Since σαT (k) = 0, we have ǫH(k) = +∞. Let us then consider
the values of k such that ǫH(k) = 0. By continuity of ǫH(k), there must exist
at least one solution of this equation in the interior of (k, k¯) if θ is sufficiently
close to 0, i.e. δ close to 0 and β close to 1. However multiple solutions may
arise. More precisely, we get ǫH(k) = 0 if and only if
σ(k) = 1−s(k)s(k)G/(Af(k))∆(k) = σ
α
T (k)
Assume first that δ = 0. In this case, k¯ = +∞. Over the set of values of k that
are solutions of this equation, let us denote k˜ the maximal value which satisfies
∆(k˜) = 1−G/(Af(k˜)
1+αAf ′(k˜)
= σ(k˜) s(k˜)G/(Af(k˜))
1−s(k˜)
We can then compute
H(k˜) = σ(k˜) s(k˜)Gf
′(k˜)/(f(k˜))
1−s(k˜)
It follows that there generically exists an even number of steady states solutions
of H(k) = 0 if and only if H(k˜) > (1− β)/β. We conclude therefore that there
exists β0 ∈ (0, 1) as given by
β0 =
[
1 + σ(k˜) s(k˜)Gf
′(k˜)/(f(k˜))
1−s(k˜)
]−1
such that H(k˜) > (1− β)/β if and only if β ∈ (β0, 1). By continuity, there exist
δˆ ∈ (0, 1) and thus βδ ∈ (0, 1) such that the same results holds if δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and
β ∈ (βδ, 1). The result follows considering βˆ = maxδ∈(0,δˆ) βδ.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (13) and (15), we get the following elasticity:
ǫH,G(k) ≡
∂H(k)
∂G
G
H(k) = −
G/(Af(k))
1+αδ−G/(Af(k)) < 0
We derive that (dk/k)/(dG/G) = −ǫH,G(k)/ǫH(k) has the sign of ǫH(k).
Using (13) and (15) again, we get:
ǫH,α(k) ≡
∂H(k)
∂α
α
H(k) = −
α(1/β−1)
1+αδ−G/(Af(k)) < 0
Therefore, (dk/k)/(dα/α) = −ǫH,α(k)/ǫH(k) has the sign of ǫH(k).
7Of course, if G further tends to 0, we also have that k tends to 0.
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Using (13) and (14), we note that the stationary level of consumption can
also be written c = Af(k)− δk −G. We derive that:
dc
dα =
∂c
∂k
∂k
∂α = −(Af
′(k)− δ) kα
ǫH,α(k)
ǫH(k)
which has the sign of ǫH(k). We also find that:
dc
dG =
1
ǫH(k)
[
s(k)
1+αδ−G/(Af(k))
Af ′(k)(1−G/(Af(k))−δ
Af ′(k) +
1−s(k)
σ(k)
1
1+αAf ′(k)
]
Using (13) and (15), we can show that [1−G/(Af(k))]Af ′(k) > δ, which allows
us to conclude that dc/dG has the sign of ǫH(k). We finally observe that the
welfare evaluated at a steady state is increasing in c. Therefore, the results
follow from the fact that ǫH(ko) > 0 and ǫH(ke) < 0.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The existence of a normalized steady state k = 1 is ensured if there is a unique
A > 0 solving
Γ(A) ≡ f ′(1)A(1+αδ)−G/f(1)1+αAf ′(1) =
θ
β (24)
Obviously, Γ′(A) > 0, Γ(0) = −f ′(1)G/f(1) < θ/β and Γ(+∞) = (1 + αδ)/α.
Under Assumption 3, we have Γ(+∞) > θ/β, which means that there is a unique
A∗ as given by
A∗ =
θ
β+Gs(1)
f ′(1)(1−α(1−β)β )
(25)
that solves Γ(A∗) = θ/β.
We need also to verify that 1 ∈ (k, k]. We get 1 > k if and only if 1 + αδ >
G/(A∗f(1)) which obviously follows from (24). Let us focus now on 1 < k¯ which
holds if and only if G/(A∗f(1)) > α(δ − A∗f ′(1)). Using the expression of A∗,
we easily show that A∗f ′(1) > δ. The stationary consumption level is finally
derived from (14).
6.5 Proof of Corollary 2
The normalized steady state satisfies (c, k) = (1, (1/β − 1)(1 + αA∗f(1)) +
∆(1)w(1)). Let us denote f = f(1), f ′ = f ′(1) and ∆ = ∆(1). As shown by
equations (16) and (17), k = 1 is located on an increasing portion of H(k) if
and only if
σ > σαT (1) ≡
1−s
sG/(A∗f)∆(1)
Using (24) and (25), we get:
G
A∗f =
sG(β−α(1−β))
θ+sβG and ∆(1) =
θ
β
β−α(1−β)
θ+sβG
(26)
We then derive that
σαT (1) ≡ σT =
(1−s)θ
s2βG
(27)
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6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
We characterize the stability properties and the occurrence of local bifurcations
by linearizing the dynamic system (11)-(12) around the normalized steady state
(c, k) = (1, (1/β − 1)(1 + αA∗f(1)) + ∆(1)w(1)).
Lemma 6.1. Under Assumptions 1-3, the characteristic polynomial is given by
P (λ) ≡ λ2−T (α, σ)λ+D(α) = 0, where D(α) and T (α, σ) are the determinant
and the trace of the associated Jacobian matrix:
D(α) = ǫccB3(α)
ǫcc
(
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
)
+θ
B4(α)
∆
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
T (α, σ) = 1 +D(α) +
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
θ
(
1−s
σ −
B4(α)
∆ −
B5(α,σ)
∆
)
ǫcc
(
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
)
+θ
B4(α)
∆
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
with
B1(α) ≡
θ
β
β − α(1 − β) + α(θ + sβG)
s[β − α(1 − β)] + α(θ + sβG)
> δ (28)
B2(α) ≡ s
β − α(1− β) + α(θ + sβG)
s[β − α(1 − β)] + α(θ + sβG)
> 0 (29)
B3(α) ≡ 1− δ +
θ
β
1− α(1− δ)
1 + αδ −G/(A∗f)
(30)
B4(α) ≡
αs
1 + αA∗f ′
> 0 (31)
B5(α, σ) ≡
(
G
A∗f − α
)
s(1 + αA∗f ′) + αA∗f ′ 1−sσ
(
1 + αδ − GA∗f
)
(1 + αA∗f ′)2
(32)
Proof. Linearizing the dynamical system (11)-(12) around k = 1, we obtain:(
ǫcc + θ
B4(α)
∆
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
)
dct+1
c =
[
ǫcc +
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
θ
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
(
1−s
σ −
B5(α,σ)
∆ −
B4(α)
∆
B3(α)
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
)]
dct
c
− B3(α)θ
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
(
1−s
σ −
B5(α,σ)
∆ −
B4(α)
∆
B3(α)
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
)
dkt
k
(
1− θαβ(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
)
dkt+1
k = −
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
dct
c +B3(α)
dkt
k
where B1(α), B2(α), B3(α), B4(α) and B5(α, σ) are given by (28)-(32). Since
T (α, σ) and D(α) are respectively the trace and the determinant of the associ-
ated Jacobian matrix, the lemma follows after simplifications.
We may now prove Proposition 4. Let α = 0. Using Lemma 6.1, we get
D(0) = 1− δ +
θ
β
1
1−G/(A∗f)
=
1
β
+ sG ≡ D0 > 1 (33)
T (0, σ) = 1 +D0 +
θ
ǫcc
(
θ
sβ
− δ
)(
1− s
σ
− s
G/(A∗f)
1−G/(A∗f)
)
≡ T0(σ) (34)
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Equation (33) implies that the steady state is never a sink. Using (34), we
conclude that T0(σ) is decreasing in σ with T0(0) = +∞ and
T0(+∞) = 1 +D0 −
θ
ǫcc
(
θ
sβ − δ
)
s G/(A
∗f)
1−G/(A∗f) (35)
We then have T0(+∞) < 1+D0 and T0(+∞) < −1−D0 if and only if ǫcc < ǫ
0
F ,
with
ǫ0F ≡
( θsβ−δ)sβG/(A
∗f)
2
(
1+ 2−δ
A∗f′
) (36)
Graphically we derive from these results:
✻
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Figure 2: The case ǫcc > ǫ
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Figure 3: The case ǫcc < ǫ
0
F .
Let σ0T be defined by 1− T0(σ
0
T ) +D0 = 0 and σ
0
F by 1 + T0(σ
0
F ) +D0 = 0.
Straightforward computations using (33)-(34) give
σ0F ≡
(1−s)θ( θsβ−δ)
2s(ǫ0F−ǫcc)A
∗f ′
(
1+ 2−δ
A∗f′
) (37)
and σ0T = σT as given by (27). We get 1 − T0(σ) + D0 < 0 for σ < σT ,
1−T0(σ)+D0 > 0 and 1+T0(σ)+D0 > 0 for σ ∈ (σT , σ
0
F ), and 1+T0(σ)+D0 < 0
for σ > σ0F . The results follow by setting σ
0
F = +∞ when ǫcc ≥ ǫ
0
F .
6.7 Proof of Proposition 5
From Lemma 6.1, using (28)-(31), we observe that D(α) is increasing in ǫcc.
When ǫcc tends to 0, D(α) tends to 0, while, using (24) and (25), when ǫcc
tends to +∞, we get under Assumption 3:
limǫcc→+∞D(α) ≡ D+∞(α) =
B3(α)
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
= 1+sβG−α(1−δ)(1−β)β−α(1−β) > 1
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Therefore, there exists a value ǫαH , as given by
ǫαH ≡
(θ+βGs)βαs
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
βGs+(1−β)(1+αδ)
(38)
such that D+∞(α) ∈ (0, 1) for ǫcc < ǫ
α
H , D+∞(α) = 1 for ǫcc = ǫ
α
H and
D+∞(α) > 1 for ǫcc > ǫ
α
H .
Consider now the trace T (α, σ) as given in Lemma 6.1. We immediately get
T (α, 0) = +∞. When σ tends to +∞, we have:
T (α,+∞) = 1 +D(α)−
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
θs G/(A
∗f)
1+αδ−G/(A∗f)
ǫcc
(
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
)
+θ
B4(α)
∆
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
Therefore, T (α,+∞) < 1 +D(α). We can also show that:
∂T (α,σ)
∂σ = −
1
σ2
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
θ(1−s)
1+αA∗f′
ǫcc
(
1− θα
β(1+αδ−G/(A∗f))
)
+θ
B4(α)
∆
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
< 0
Finally we get T (α,+∞) > −1−D(α) if ǫcc > ǫ
α
F , whereas T (α,+∞) < −1−
D(α) if ǫcc < ǫ
α
F , with
ǫαF ≡
βs
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
(G/(A∗f)−2α)
2
(
1+ 2−δ
A∗f′
) (39)
Let us now provide a useful technical result:
Lemma 6.2. Under Assumptions 1-3, there exist β˜ ∈ (0, 1) and δ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such
that when β ∈ (β˜, 1) and δ ∈ (0, δ˜), then ǫαH is an increasing function of α while
ǫαF is a decreasing function of α. Moreover, there exist α˜, αǫF ∈ (0, αMax) with
α˜ < αǫF such that:
i) ǫαH < ǫ
α
F if and only if α ∈ [0, α˜),
ii) ǫαF > 0 if and only if α ∈ [0, αǫF ).
Proof. Using (28) and (29), we get:
B1(α)−δ
B2(α)
= (θ/β−sδ)(β−α(1−β))+α(θ+sβG)(θ/β−δ)s[β−α(1−β)+α(θ+sβG)] (40)
Under Assumption 3, this expression and (38) yield lim
α→0
ǫαH = 0 and lim
α→αMax
ǫαH =
β. Moreover, substituting (40) into (38), we obtain:
ǫαH = (θ + sβG)
α(a1α+a2)
a3α2+a4α+a5
with
a1 ≡ s(1− β)(G + δ), a2 ≡ θ − sβδ, a3 ≡ δ(1 − β)(δ + sG)
a4 ≡ δ(1− β) + (δ + sG)(1 − β + sβG), a5 ≡ 1− β + sβG (41)
The sign of ∂ǫαH/∂α is given by the sign of
A(α) = (a1a4 − a2a3)α
2 + 2a1a5α+ a2a5
Using (41), we get a1a5 > 0, a2a5 > 0 and
a1a4 − a2a3 = s(1− β)(G + δ)[δ(1 − β) + (δ + sG)(1− β + sβG)]
−(θ − sβδ)δ(1 − β)(δ + sG) ≡ ϕ(δ)
Since ϕ(0) = s2G2(1− β)(1 − β + sβG) > 0, there exists δ˜ > 0 such that when
δ ∈ (0, δ˜), ϕ(δ) > 0 and ǫαH is increasing in α.
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Similarly, under Assumption 3, (26), (40) and (39) yield lim
α→0
ǫαF = ǫ
0
F as
given by (36) and lim
α→αMax
ǫαF < 0. Moreover, substituting (26) and (40) into
(39), we obtain:
ǫαF =
b3−αb2−α
2b1
2(b4+αb5+α2b6)
with
b1 ≡ (1− β)s(δ +G)[(1 + β)sG + 2θ]
b2 ≡ 2θ(θ − sβδ) + sG [θ(1 + β)− βs[2δ + (1− β)G]]
b3 ≡ sβG(θ − sβδ), b4 ≡ 1 + β + sβG
b5 ≡ (δ + sG)(1 + β + sβG) − (1− β)(2 − δ)
b6 ≡ (1− β)(2 − δ)(δ + sG)
(42)
Note that there exists βb2 ∈ [0, 1) and βb5 ∈ [0, 1) such that b2 > 0 when
β ∈ (βb2 , 1) and b5 > 0 when β ∈ (βb5 , 1). Let us then denote β˜ = max{βb2 , βb5}.
The sign of ∂ǫαF /∂α is given by the sign of
B(α) = −
[
b2b4 + b3b5 + 2α(b1b4 − b3b6) + α
2(b1b5 + b2b6)
]
We get
b1b4 − b3b6 = (1− β)
[
2s[δ(1 + β) +G] + sβG
[
δ(δ + sG) + 2[1− δ(1− s)]
]]
> 0
Therefore, if β ∈ (β˜, 1), B(α) < 0 and ǫαF is decreasing in α. The lemma follows
from these results.
Depending on the value of α, we derive different graphical representations.
1 - If α ∈ (0, α˜), we get:
✻
✲
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
T
D
1
−1
−2 2
1 + T (α, σ) +Dα = 0
1− T (α, σ) +Dα = 0
σ → 0σ = +∞
σT
Figure 4: The case α ∈ (0, α˜) with ǫcc > ǫ
α
F .
✻
✲
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
T
D
1
−1
−2 2
1 + T (α, σ) +Dα = 0
1− T (α, σ) +Dα = 0
σ → 0σ = +∞
σTσ
α
F
Figure 5: The case α ∈ (0, α˜) with ǫαH < ǫcc < ǫ
α
F .
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✻✲
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
T
D
1
−1
−2 2
1 + T (α, σ) +Dα = 0
1− T (α, σ) +Dα = 0
σ → 0
σ = +∞ σTσ
α
F
Figure 6: The case α ∈ (0, α˜) with ǫcc < ǫ
α
H .
2 - If α ∈ (α˜, αǫF ), we get the same configuration as in Figure 4 when
ǫcc > ǫ
α
H and the same configuration as in Figure 6 when ǫcc < ǫ
α
F . On the
contrary, when ǫαF ≤ ǫcc < ǫ
α
H , we get:
✻
✲
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
T
D
1
−1
−2 2
1 + T (α, σ) +Dα = 0
1− T (α, σ) +Dα = 0
σ → 0
σ = +∞ σT
Figure 7: The case α ∈ (α˜, αǫF ) with ǫ
α
F ≤ ǫcc < ǫ
α
H .
3 - If α ∈ (αǫF , αMax), we get the same configuration as in Figure 4 when
ǫcc > ǫ
α
H and the same configuration as in Figure 7 when ǫcc < ǫ
α
H .
In all these different cases, there exists a unique value σαT , defined by 1 −
T (σαT )+D = 0 and such that σ
α
T = σT as given by (27), which does not depend
on α.
If ǫcc < ǫ
α
F , there is also a unique value σ
α
F , defined by 1+T (α, σ
α
F )+D(α) = 0
and given by
σαF ≡
(1−s)θ
B1−δ
B2
2(ǫαF−ǫcc)A
∗f ′
(
1+ 2−δ
A∗f′
) (43)
The proposition follows from these different figures.
6.8 Proof of Corollary 4
As shown in Lemma 6.2, when β ∈ (β˜, 1) and δ ∈ (0, δ˜), ǫαH is an increasing
function of α while ǫαF is a decreasing function of α. We get graphically:
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ǫαF
ǫαH
0
β
αMax
ǫαMaxF
α˜ αǫF
ǫα˜H
ǫ0F
ǫcc
αH
αˆ
Figure 8: Effects of α when ǫcc ∈ (ǫ
α˜
H , ǫ
0
F ).
When α = α˜, the corresponding value of ǫαH is denoted ǫ
α˜
H . Let us assume that
ǫcc ∈ (ǫ
α˜
H , ǫ
0
F ). Then, there exist αˆ ∈ (0, α˜) and αH ∈ (α˜, αMax) such that
ǫcc < ǫ
α
F if and only if α ∈ [0, αˆ) and ǫcc > ǫ
α
H if and only if α ∈ [0, αH).
Let us consider now the critical value σαF as given by (43). Using (25), (28)
and (29), we get
σαF =
(1−s)θ
2sβ
θ−sβδ+α(1−β)s(δ+G)
(2−δ+ θ+sβGβ−α(1−β) )(ǫαF−ǫcc)[1+α(δ+sG)]
We easily derive that
limα→αˆ− σ
α
F = +∞
Moreover, for any given ǫcc < ǫ
α
F , the sign of the derivative ∂σ
α
F /∂α is given by
the sign of the following expression
Φ(α) = − [θ − sβδ + α(1 − β)s(δ +G)] [1 + α(δ + sG)]
×
{
(1−β)(θ+sβG)
[β−α(1−β)]2 (ǫ
α
F − ǫcc) +
∂ǫαF
∂α
(
2− δ + θ+sβG)β−α(1−β)
)}
−
(
2− δ + θ+sβG)β−α(1−β)
)
(ǫαF − ǫcc)δ(1 − s)(θ + sβG)
We know that if β ∈ (β˜, 1) then ∂ǫαF /∂α < 0. Therefore, there exist βσF ∈ (0, 1)
and δσF ∈ (0, δ˜) such that σ
α
F is a monotone increasing function of α when β ∈
(βσF , 1) and δ ∈ (0, δσF ). Let us denote β = max{β˜, βσF } and δ¯ = min{δ˜, δσF }.
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Let us finally assume that β ∈ (β, 1), δ ∈ (0, δ¯) and σ > σ0F (> σT ) with σ
0
F as
given by (37). Then, there exists αF ∈ (0, αˆ) such that σ > σ
α
F if and only if
α ∈ [0, αF ). The results follow from Proposition 5.
References
[1] Blundell, R., and T. MaCurdy (1999), Labour supply: A review of alter-
native approaches, in Handbook of Labor Economics, Ashenfelter, O. and
D. Card (eds.) North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1559-1695.
[2] de la Croix, D. and P. Michel (2002): A Theory of Economic Growth,
Dynamics and Policy in Overlapping Generations. Cambridge University
Press.
[3] Futagami, K., T. Iwaisako and R. Ohdoi (2008), Debt policy rule, pro-
ductive government spending, and multiple growth paths, Macroeconomic
Dynamics 12, 445-462.
[4] Giannitsarou, C. (2007), Balanced budget rules and aggregate instability:
the role of consumption taxes, The Economic Journal 117, 1423-1435.
[5] Grandmont, J.-M., P. Pintus and R. de Vilder (1998), Capital-labour sub-
stitution and competitive nonlinear endogenous business cycles, Journal of
Economic Theory 80, 14-59.
[6] Greiner, A. (2007), An endogenous growth model with public capital and
sustainable government debt, Japanese Economic Review 58, 345-361.
[7] Guo, J.T. and K. Lansing (2009), Capital-labor substitution and equilib-
rium indeterminacy, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 1991-
2000.
[8] Lloyd-Braga, T., L. Modesto and T. Seegmuller (2014), Market distortions
and local indeterminacy: A general approach, Journal of Economic Theory
151, 216-247.
[9] Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2012), Persistent deficit, growth and indetermi-
nacy, Macroeconomic Dynamics 16, 267-283.
[10] Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2013), Debt policy rule, productive government
spending, and multiple growth paths: A note, Macroeconomic Dynamics
17, 947-954.
[11] Nourry, C., T. Seegmuller and A. Venditti (2013), Aggregate instability
under balanced-budget consumption taxes: A re-examination, Journal of
Economic Theory 148, 1977-2006.
[12] Ramsey, F. P. (1928), A mathematical theory of saving, Economic Journal
38, 543-559.
24
[13] Rogerson, R. and J. Wallenius (2009), Micro and macro elasticities in a life
cycle model with taxes, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 2277-2292.
[14] Schmitt-Grohe´, S. and M. Uribe (1997), Balanced-budget rules, distor-
tionary taxes, and aggregate instability, Journal of Political Economy 105,
976-1000.
25
